Massiah v. United States by Kamisar, Yale
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications Faculty Scholarship
2009
Massiah v. United States
Yale Kamisar
University of Michigan Law School, ykamisar@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/133
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kamisar, Yale. "Massiah v. United States." In The Oxford Guide to United States Supreme Court Decisions. 2d ed., edited by K. L. Hall and
J. W. Ely Jr., 208-10. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.
Publisher:  Oxford University Press Print Publication Date:  2009
Print ISBN-13:  9780195379396 Published online:  2009
Current Online Version:  2009 eISBN:  9780199891511
The Oxford Guide to United States Supreme Court
Decisions (2 ed.)
Edited by Kermit L. Hall and James W. Ely Jr.
Oxford Reference
Massiah v. United States,  
377 U.S. 201 (1964), argued 3 Mar. 1964, decided 18 May 1964 by vote of 6 to 3; Stewart for the Court, White in dissent.
Massiah was decided at a time when the Warren Court's “revolution in American criminal procedure” was accelerating.
According to Massiah, after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings (by indictment, as in Massiah's case, or by
information, preliminary hearing or arraignment), the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to rely on counsel
as the “medium” between himself and the government. Thus, once adversary proceedings have begun, the government
cannot bypass the defendant's lawyer and deliberately elicit statements from the defendant himself.
The Burger Court revived and even expanded the Massiah doctrine in Brewer v. Williams (1977) and United States v.
Henry (1980). As a result, the doctrine has become a more potent force than it had ever been during the Warren Court
years.
After he had been indicted for federal narcotics violations, Winston Massiah retained a lawyer, pled not guilty, and was
released on bail. Jesse Colson, a codefendant who had also pled not guilty and been released on bail, invited Massiah to
discuss the pending case in Colson's car. Unknown to Massiah, his codefendant had become a government agent and had
hidden a radio transmitter in his car. The Massiah-Colson conversation was broadcast to a nearby federal agent. As
expected, Massiah made several incriminating statements.
The Massiah facts are a far cry from a typical confession case. Massiah was neither in “custody” nor subjected to “police
interrogation” as that term is normally used. Indeed, Massiah thought he was simply talking to a friend and a partner in
crime. Nevertheless, a 6-to-3 majority held that the defendant's statements could not be used against him at his trial. The
decisive feature of the case was that after adversary proceedings had commenced against the defendant, and therefore at a
time when he was entitled to a lawyer's help, the government had deliberately set out to elicit incriminating statements
from him in the absence of counsel. This constituted a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The government argued that there was reason to think that Massiah was part of a large, well-organized drug ring and that
therefore it was entirely proper for federal agents to continue their investigation of him and his alleged confederates even
though he had already been indicted. The Supreme Court responded that, even though the police were justified in
investigating other crimes when they obtained Massiah's statements, the defendant's own incriminating statements
pertaining to charges pending against him could not be used at the trial of those charges. On the other hand, evidence
pertaining to new crimes as to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was
obtained would be admissible even though other charges against the defendant were pending at the time. This approach
was reaffirmed in Maine v. Moulton (1985).
Although overshadowed by, and often confused with Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the Massiah doctrine is a separate and
distinct rule, and it supplements Miranda in important respects. Miranda is based on the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination and the now-familiar Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is subjected to custodial police
interrogation, which the Warren Court deemed inherently coercive. Massiah is based on the right to counsel. Its application
turns not on the conditions surrounding police questioning, but on whether, at the time the government attempts to elicit
incriminating statements from an individual, the criminal proceedings against that individual have reached the point at
which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
The difference between Massiah and Miranda is underscored by the “jail plant” situation, the case where a secret
government agent is placed in the same cell with a person and instructed to induce him to implicate himself in the crime for
which he has been incarcerated. Miranda does not apply, for the inherent coercion generated by custodial police
interrogation is not present when a prisoner speaks freely to a person he believes to be a fellow inmate. Coercion is
determined from the perspective of the suspect. Therefore, unless a person realizes he is dealing with a government agent,
the government's efforts to elicit damaging admissions from him do not constitute “police interrogation” within the
meaning of Miranda.
However, the Massiah doctrine would prohibit the government from using such tactics if adversary proceedings had
already been initiated against the person, as the Court held in United States v. Henry (1980). But the secret government
agent was not completely passive in that case; he stimulated conversations about the crime charged. The Court, however,
has permitted the government to place a completely “passive listener” in a person's cell and use the statements acquired by
such an agent even though adversary proceedings have commenced against the person. The line between “active” and
“passive” agents—between eliciting incriminating statements and merely listening—is an exceedingly difficult one to
draw.
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